Independence and interdependence: lessons from the hive by List, Christian & Vermeule, Adrian
  
Christian List and Adrian Vermeule 
Independence and interdependence: 
lessons from the hive 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
List, Christian and Vermeule, Adrian (2014) Independence and interdependence: lessons from 
the hive. Rationality and Society, 26 (2). pp. 170-207. ISSN 1043-4631  
DOI: 10.1177/1043463114523713  
 
© 2014 by SAGE Publications 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56678/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2014 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
  
Independence and Interdependence: Lessons from the Hive 
Christian List and Adrian Vermeule* 
Abstract: There is a substantial class of collective decision problems whose successful solution 
requires interdependence among decision makers at the agenda-setting stage and independence at 
the stage of choice. We define this class of problems and describe and apply a search-and-decision 
mechanism theoretically modeled in the context of honeybees and identified in earlier empirical 
work in biology. The honeybees’ mechanism has useful implications for mechanism design in 
human institutions, including courts, legislatures, executive appointments, research and 
development in firms, and basic research in the sciences. Our paper offers a fresh perspective on 
the idea of “biomimicry” in institutional design and raises the possibility of comparative 
institutional analysis across species.  
Keywords: Biomimicry, collective decision making, comparative institutional analysis, 
independence, information pooling, interdependence  
For centuries, homo sapiens has learned tricks of design from other species, including both non-human 
animals and plants. In applied sciences such as engineering and aerodynamics, “biomimicry” exploits 
designs that arise from natural selection. The inventor of Velcro hook-and-loop fasteners, used in 
everyday clothes as well as high-tech products, copied the hooks by which cockleburs snag the fur of 
passing animals; the shape of the Mercedes Benz bionic car mimics the boxfish to maximize aerodynamic 
efficiency; and Speedo’s Fastskin body-hugging swimsuit, recently adopted by most Olympic swimmers, 
mimics the micro-features of sharkskin to minimize drag (Bushan 2009).  
In the study of social organization, likewise, there is a long tradition of comparisons between humans 
and other animals. Of these the most famous may be Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (1714), but 
comparison and contrast between humans and social insects is much older.1 Yet such analogies and 
disanalogies are typically either a literary conceit, as in Mandeville’s case, or when meant seriously have 
  
been pseudo-scientific. Indeed, there is an equally long history of politically motivated abuse of 
biological analogies, so much so that in some quarters the very notion is taboo (Rodgers 2009). 
In recent years, however, scholars working at the intersection of biology and the social sciences have 
produced a growing body of research on collective decision making in the world of non-human animals. 
Herds of red deer appear to use a qualified majority rule for group decisions whether to move on or stay 
put, while among African elephants a majority of adult females decides (Conradt and Roper 2005). Some 
of the most striking findings concern social insects. Recent work has begun to put micro-foundations 
under the notion that insect colonies in some sense make collective decisions (e.g., List, Elsholtz and 
Seeley 2009, Franks et al. 2009, Seeley 2010); and it turns out that they make collective decisions 
extremely well, and through striking procedures. We suggest that homo sapiens can learn from these 
procedures, both in the theoretical sense and at the level of institutional design. In this paper, we develop 
some of these lessons from the hive for collective decision making.2 
Broadly speaking, there are two ideal types of collective decision problems: first, those in which 
individuals have the same fundamental preferences, but different information or beliefs and (hence) 
different derived preferences; and second, those in which there is a bedrock conflict of fundamental 
preferences.3 The former are epistemic problems, the latter distributive ones. Of course, there are many 
mixed cases, but for clarity it is useful to focus on the extremes.  
Both types of problems arise frequently in human groups. In what follows, we elicit some lessons 
from the hive for epistemic problems. Because worker bees do not reproduce themselves and their shared 
genetic interest is to help the mother queen survive and reproduce (e.g., Seeley 2005, 2010), conflict of 
fundamental preferences is minimal within the hive. As we will see, however, differences of information 
or belief are very much present, and social insects use intriguing mechanisms to sort out those differences 
and to settle upon a joint course of action. 
The main lesson from the hive for epistemic decision making is the value of balancing independence 
and interdependence. In our central example, based on recent work in biology, honeybees can be 
  
understood as using a special decision procedure for choosing nest sites: the bees prefer, all else equal, to 
assess options advertised by other bees, and in that sense decide interdependently, yet they assess those 
options in an independent manner, as formally defined below. The bees behave interdependently in 
setting the epistemic agenda, and independently in deciding whether to support – to “vote” for – any 
given option.4 
By balancing independence and interdependence in this way, the honeybees have hit on an insight 
often overlooked by decision theorists. Teasing out the implications of Condorcet’s jury theorem, the 
literature on epistemic collective decision problems emphasizes the centrality and value of independence 
among the members of decision-making groups (for introductions, see Grofman, Owen and Feld 1983, 
List and Goodin 2001; in constitutional contexts, see Sunstein 2009, Vermeule 2009). Although it 
recognizes that complete independence is not always attainable, independence remains a key ideal and 
any kind of interdependence between decision makers is seen primarily as a risk.5 Moreover, the 
literature typically takes the agenda for epistemic decision making as exogenous, leaving it unspecified 
how groups with common preferences but dispersed information do or should decide what options they 
will decide among. 
By contrast, our claim is that there is a substantial class of collective decision problems in which 
successful collective decision making requires interdependence at the stage of epistemic agenda-setting, 
as well as independence at the stage of choice. This generalizes and applies a mechanism theoretically 
modeled in the context of honeybees (List, Elsholtz and Seeley 2009) and identified in earlier empirical 
work in biology (e.g., Seeley, Visscher and Passino 2006, Lindauer 1955; for a recent overview, see 
Seeley 2010). We suggest that in a broad class of decision problems involving collective search, decision 
makers do best by striking a balance between independence and interdependence.   
People are not bees. Likewise, automobiles are not boxfish; yet automotive engineers can design better 
cars by studying fish. Perhaps humans can design better decision procedures by studying insects. Our 
suggestion is emphatically not that humans should mindlessly copy the hive, or that any decision 
  
procedure in use among social insects or other non-human animals can be directly transposed to the 
human world. Rather, certain structural features of decision-making environments, such as tradeoffs 
between speed and accuracy (to take an example discussed below), are common to decision making by 
humans and non-humans, in some settings. If natural selection has led to highly successful decision 
procedures for non-human animal groups in such environments, there is no reason not to examine those 
procedures to deepen our theoretical understanding and broaden our institutional repertoire. 
Section I introduces Condorcet’s jury theorem, explains the state of the literature on epistemic 
collective decision making, and shows that the literature both makes independence a central epistemic 
ideal, and also leaves agenda-setting exogenous – a mysterious black box. Section II introduces the 
problem of nest-site choice facing honeybee swarms, reviews a decision-making mechanism that 
combines interdependent agenda-setting with independent voting, and identifies general conditions under 
which such a mechanism will perform well. Section III applies the honeybees’ mechanism to illuminate, 
and critique, a range of decision-making procedures in human institutions, including the certiorari process 
on the United States Supreme Court, agenda-setting by legislative committees, appointments in firms and 
universities, the choice of candidates by political parties, and the choice of research projects in 
commercial firms and in basic science. After detailing several applications, we consider in general terms 
how certain strategies of mechanism design – particularly “veiling mechanisms” that separate 
interdependent agenda-setting from independent evaluation of agenda items – can be helpful or even 
necessary to replicate some of the strengths of the bees’ decision-making mechanism in human 
institutions. In the Conclusion, we return to the question whether the hive offers useful lessons. 
I. Independence and the Jury Theorem 
In an epistemic collective decision problem, a group of two or more individuals faces a choice among a 
number of options, where the individuals have common fundamental preferences but possibly different 
beliefs. That is, the individuals may disagree about the preferability of the options, but these 
disagreements are only informational. An omniscient observer would be able to rank the options in an 
  
objective order that reflects the individuals’ common preferences, and the individuals themselves would 
agree with this ranking, were they fully informed. We are looking for a mechanism by which the group 
can maximize its chance of choosing the best option or options. 
Condorcet’s jury theorem says that, under two conditions, majority rule provides such a mechanism, at 
least when there are only two options (e.g., Grofman, Owen and Feld 1983) (there are various ways of 
extending the theorem to more than two options, e.g., List and Goodin 2001). In the binary case, the 
conditions are the following. First, each individual has a better-than-random chance of identifying the 
best option (the “competence condition”); specifically, each individual has a probability greater than one-
half of judging the first option to be best if this is the case, and of judging the second option to be best if 
that is the case. Secondly, the judgments of different individuals are mutually independent (the 
“independence condition”); that is, any individual’s judgment about which option is best does not depend 
on any other individual’s judgment on this question. Under these conditions, the probability that the 
majority supports the best option exceeds each individual’s probability of doing so and approaches one – 
certainty – as the number of individuals increases.  
Although simple to state in theory, the theorem’s two conditions are often hard to meet in practice. 
The competence condition requires individual judgments to be positively correlated with the truth. 
Despite the initial plausibility of this condition, we can think of a number of cases in which, due to a lack 
of information, systematic bias, or the inherent difficulty of a judgmental task, individual judgments lack 
the required correlation with the truth; and when there is no such correlation, majority decisions are no 
better than random at picking the best option. Moreover, when there is a negative correlation, the reverse 
of Condorcet’s effect kicks in: the probability that the majority supports the best option will then be 
smaller than each individual’s probability and will approach zero with increasing group size.  
Even more challenging than the competence condition, in many contexts, is the independence 
condition.6 If different individuals base their judgments on the same source of information or a limited 
number of sources, these judgments may become mutually dependent, and pooling them, as majority 
  
voting does, cannot provide us with any new information beyond what was contained in the shared 
information they were based on. In the limiting case of perfect correlation between different individuals’ 
judgments, the majority decision is no more reliable than the decision of any individual.  
In general, how mutual interdependence between different individuals’ judgments affects the 
reliability of the resulting majority decision depends on the structure of the interdependence. To explain 
this, it helps to subdivide the conclusion of the jury theorem into two parts. The so-called “non-
asymptotic” part states that the probability of a correct majority decision exceeds each individual’s 
corresponding probability, while the so-called “asymptotic” part states that this probability approaches 
one with increasing group size. It can be shown that some forms of dependence between different 
individuals’ judgments preserve both parts of the theorem’s conclusion and only reduce the speed with 
which the probability of a correct majority decision converges to one. Such forms of dependence are in 
effect equivalent to a reduced group size and can be offset by increasing that size again. Dependence of 
this benign sort occurs, for example, when individuals derive their judgments from a mix of private 
information and signals received from others, whether from opinion leaders or from their peers (as 
discussed, e.g., in Ladha 1992, Estlund 1994). 
By contrast, other forms of dependence between individuals have more dramatic consequences for the 
jury theorem, not merely reducing the speed with which the majority reliability converges to one with 
increasing group size, but undermining the second, asymptotic part of the jury theorem altogether. 
Suppose, for example, the members of a jury have epistemic access to the truth about a particular crime 
only via the shared body of evidence presented in the court room; none of the jurors has any private 
information that bypasses this single evidential route to the truth.7 Familiar rules of evidence impose 
precisely this constraint. The jury’s reliability – its probability of convicting the defendant if and only if 
the defendant is guilty – may then still exceed the reliability of each individual juror, and so the non-
asymptotic part of the jury theorem may continue to hold; together, the jurors may arrive at a more 
consistent interpretation of the evidence, for example. But the jury’s reliability will never overcome the 
  
epistemic bottleneck created by the jurors’ mutual dependence on a single evidentiary route to the truth. 
If that shared evidence is limited or misleading, for example, they will never be able to transcend that 
limitation, regardless of how many jurors there are. In consequence, the reliability of the majority 
decision is subject to an upper bound at some threshold strictly below one – a maximal feasible level of 
reliability – which depends on the nature and quality of the evidence (for a revised jury theorem in this 
context, see Dietrich and List 2004; for recent, more general results, see Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013).   
How pervasive is the kind of interdependence between different jurors’ judgments that threatens the 
applicability of the jury theorem? This question is an empirical one, but even a cursory reflection on how 
opinion leaders and other epistemic bottlenecks can affect the formation of individual opinions in real-
world settings suggests that violations of Condorcet’s independence condition are frequent. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that, although it is possible for Condorcet’s two conditions to be 
simultaneously true, we can never obtain any evidence to corroborate their joint truth (Dietrich 2008). 
The reason, in very rough terms, is that to corroborate the competence condition, we must not focus on 
each individual’s judgment in a single isolated decision problem, where we have no way of quantifying 
the individual’s reliability, but we must average over a larger reference class of “similar” decision 
problems; some problems in that class will be easier, others harder, yet on average each individual may 
be shown to display the required competence. But once we look at such a larger reference class of 
decision problems, independence can no longer be corroborated; the reference class will inevitably 
exhibit some internal heterogeneity – as noted, some problems in it will be harder, others easier – and 
therefore judgmental performance is bound to be correlated across different individuals.   
Some of the most pernicious violations of independence are those to which decision makers are most 
oblivious, when they misinterpret a situation in which individual judgments are not independent as one in 
which independence is satisfied. Individuals are then liable to draw false confidence from what they take 
to be the confluence of several independent sources of evidence, which are in fact highly correlated. This 
phenomenon underlies the “informational cascades” responsible for market bubbles, some instances of 
  
mass hysteria, or the seemingly irrational spread of false beliefs in society (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and 
Welch 1992, Sunstein 2006). In an informational cascade, an accidental spell of support for some 
proposition or option is misinterpreted by other decision makers as evidence for the truth of the 
proposition or the quality of the option, thereby leading them to join the chorus of support. This, in turn, 
may be taken by others as even further evidence in support of the proposition or option and may thus 
trigger a snowball effect in which a small number of random signals can be amplified into a spurious 
consensus (see also List and Pettit 2004).  
These considerations illustrate the risks associated with violations of independence and reinforce the 
centrality of independence as an epistemic ideal in collective decision making. Independent and 
competent assessments of the options seem to be the key conditions for efficient collective decisions. 
However, the work reviewed so far has taken the set of options as exogenously given, focusing only on 
the process by which the pattern of individual support for them is aggregated into a collective decision. 
Once agenda setting is taken into account as well, it turns out that there is an important class of decision 
problems in which interdependence between individuals can be put to good use, even from an epistemic 
perspective, provided interdependence is confined to the agenda-setting stage and carefully balanced with 
independence at the voting stage. To show this, we now look at the way honeybees choose nest sites. 
II. The Mechanism and its Conditions 
We begin with a brief empirical description of the mechanism by which honeybees choose their nest 
sites, as studied by Seeley et al. (e.g., 2004, 2006, 2010). We then review a simple theoretical model of 
the bees’ collective decision process, drawing on recent collaborative work between social scientists and 
biologists (List, Elsholtz and Seeley 2009), which allows us to see the key determinants of the bees’ 
decision-making performance. On this basis, we suggest which aspects of the bees’ decision process may 
carry over to human collective decisions and under what conditions.  
  
A. Background 
At the end of spring or the beginning of summer, a honeybee colony that has grown too large tends to 
split. The queen bee leaves with approximately two-thirds of the worker bees, while a daughter queen 
stays in the maternal nest with the others. To survive, the bees that have left must quickly find a new nest. 
Empirical research has shown that they do so by means of a striking decision process (e.g., Seeley, 
Visscher and Passino 2006, Lindauer 1955, Seeley 2010). This involves a “search committee” of several 
hundred “scout bees” who roam the surrounding area in search for potential nest sites and then return to 
the swarm to draw the others’ attention to any good sites they have discovered.  
In particular, after discovering a potential nest site, each scout bee performs a waggle dance whose 
orientation encodes the site’s location and whose duration encodes her assessment of the site’s quality. 
The better she perceives the site to be, the longer she dances. At first, the scout bees rely on discovering 
potential nest sites by chance, but once they observe other scouts dancing, they are more likely to 
investigate the sites advertised by those others. If they agree with the positive assessment of a site, they 
join the dance for it. In this way, sites supported by dancing bees are visited and inspected more often 
than other sites and, if not supported in error, tend to receive even more support. The process leads to a 
“consensus” relatively quickly – in one or two days – when the support rallies around one popular site. 
Once a critical threshold is reached, the swarm moves there. Crucially, when there are quality differences 
between different potential nest sites, the bees usually find one of the best ones (Seeley and Buhrman 
2001). 
There are three constraints that make the speed and accuracy of this decision process all the more 
surprising. First, the agenda of options is not straightforwardly given, unlike in the decision problems to 
which Condorcet’s jury theorem is usually applied. An indefinite number of places in the bees’ 
environment could in principle become candidates for nest sites, and a suitable method of agenda setting 
is needed to sort out the serious options from the non-starters. Second, although individual bees have 
some remarkable capacities, they are still fairly simple organisms, and a simultaneous and comparative 
  
assessment of all potential nest sites is beyond any bee’s capacities. For this reason, the bees’ collective 
decision process must not place high cognitive demands on any individual bee. Third and relatedly, the 
bees’ assessment of potential nest sites and their communication are subject to a significant amount of 
noise, and the decision process must therefore be error-tolerant. So which features of the bees’ decision 
process explain its remarkable speed and accuracy, in light of these constraints? A stylized model of the 
process helps to reveal what drives its success. (An explanation of the underlying formal model is 
provided in the Appendix; here we merely indicate the main features.)  
B. A Simple Model 
The bees, like humans in a Condorcetian jury decision, face an epistemic collective decision problem, 
but, unlike in an ordinary jury decision, the set of options is more open-ended. So there is a group of 
individuals (in the present case several hundred scout bees) that has to make a choice among a number of 
options (different possible nest sites) but that number can be very large. As before, the individuals have 
common fundamental preferences but possibly different information. We can represent these preferences 
by assuming that each possible nest site has an objective, though unknown, quality level. The decision 
process extends over multiple time periods (where time, for simplicity, is discrete), and we model each 
individual scout bee’s behavior over time (employing the formal model in List, Elsholtz and Seeley 2009, 
described in the Appendix). Technically, the model is an “agent-based” model, which is defined by 
specifying, first, what state each individual scout bee can be in during each time period, and second, how 
each scout bee changes her state from one time period to the next.  
Let us begin by considering each scout bee’s possible states. In any given time period, a scout bee can 
be in one of two states: 
The non-dancing state. The bee is not dancing in support of any potential nest site, which can mean 
that she has not yet flown out to search, has not yet found any promising site, has ended a previous dance, 
is observing other bees, or is resting.   
  
The dancing state. The bee is dancing in support of a potential nest site; this state of the bee is further 
specified by one parameter: the remaining dance duration.  
We next specify how a scout bee changes her state from one time period to the next. There are two 
cases to consider: 
The first case: the bee is in the non-dancing state in the given time period. The bee has some 
probability of remaining in that state in the next period – that is, of continuing to search, observe other 
bees, or rest – and a complementary probability of finding a potential nest site that she supports, and 
thereby of switching into the dancing state. Two factors determine whether she does so: her probability of 
finding and visiting one of the possible sites, and her assessment of that site. Whether the bee finds and 
visits a site depends on how easy it is to find it – effectively, its salience on the agenda. How she assesses 
the site’s quality depends on her epistemic competence and independence. At this juncture, we can plug 
different assumptions into the model, so as to compare their implications, as discussed below.  
The second case: the bee is dancing in support of a potential nest site in the given time period. If the 
remaining dance duration is not yet over, she will continue to dance for that site in the next time period, 
that is, she will stay in the dancing state, with the remaining dance duration reduced by one period. If the 
remaining dance duration is over, she will switch back into the non-dancing state, that is, she will fly out 
to search afresh, observe other bees, or rest.   
Having specified the possible states in which each scout bee can be as well as the way each bee 
changes her state from one time period to the next, we can use computer simulations to see how the states 
of a collection of scout bees change over time and how long it takes for a “consensus” – defined as a 
sufficiently large plurality of support – to emerge for a particular nest site. The computer simulation can 
be started by assuming that in the first time period all bees are in the non-dancing state. For present 
purposes, it suffices to summarize the findings in qualitative terms (for detailed quantitative results, see 
List, Elsholtz and Seeley 2009 and the summary in the Appendix below). 
  
C. The Determinants of the Bees’ Collective Performance 
As noted, the bees’ collective performance depends on each scout bee’s probability of finding and 
visiting one of the different potential nest sites and her competence and independence in assessing any 
such site once it has come to her attention. Let us compare different assumptions about each of these 
determinants of the process: 
A scout bee’s probability of finding and visiting each potential nest site. One theoretical possibility is 
that the probability that a particular site comes to a bee’s attention depends only on the site’s location and 
other exogenous factors. This would imply no communication or interdependence between the bees. 
Formally, each bee’s unconditional probability of giving attention to a particular site would then be the 
same as her conditional probability of giving attention to it, given that one or more other bees have done 
so as well. Another possibility – the one supported by the empirical findings of field observation (e.g., 
Seeley, Visscher and Passino 2006) – is that while in the beginning a bee’s probability of finding and 
visiting each possible site depends only on exogenous factors, so that finding a site is initially a random 
event, the probability increases as other bees start dancing for it. Thus the probability that any given site 
comes to a bee’s attention – the site’s “salience” on the agenda – is a weighted combination of an ex ante 
probability of finding it and the number of other bees advertising it. The weight of the second factor 
relative to the first can be taken to represent the level of interdependence between the bees. Once there is 
some interdependence, each bee’s conditional probability of giving attention to any particular site, given 
that other bees have done so too, is higher than her unconditional probability of giving attention to it. 
A scout bee’s competence and independence in assessing any site. One theoretical possibility is that 
once a particular site comes to a bee’s attention, she mimics other bees advertising it, so that her 
subsequent dance duration for the site is not determined by an independent assessment of its quality, but 
given randomly or by copying another bee’s dance. Formally, if a bee mimics the dances of others, her 
probability of performing a dance of a particular duration for a given site, conditional on the site’s having 
come to her attention, is unrelated to the site’s quality. The empirical findings, however, support the 
  
alternative possibility that a scout bee independently assesses a site that has come to her attention and that 
her dance duration for it then correlates positively (though imperfectly) with the site’s quality. The 
strength of the correlation represents the bee’s competence. Whereas a more sophisticated agent might be 
tempted to take the observed dance activity for a given site as a proxy for its quality and not to assess it 
independently at all, a bee’s limited cognitive capacities prevent her from engaging in any such 
sophisticated epistemic free-riding.8 The technical sense in which a bee acts independently in assessing a 
site is that her probability of performing a dance of a particular duration for it, conditional on the site’s 
having come to her attention and holding its quality fixed, remains the same irrespective of whether or 
not we also conditionalize on other bees’ dance activity for it. To study the role played by this kind of 
independence, we can introduce, as a further model parameter, the probability that the bee’s dance 
duration for any site is determined by an independent assessment of its quality rather than by mimicking 
other bees. This probability ranges from zero in the counterfactual case of no independence to one in the 
case of full independence. 
So how does the bees’ predicted decision-making performance vary as we vary these central model 
parameters – the bees’ levels of interdependence, independence and competence? Computer simulations 
show the following. Assuming quality differences between different potential nest sites, both a certain 
level of interdependence in drawing each other’s attention to promising sites and a certain level of 
independence in assessing the quality of any site once it has come to a bee’s attention are needed to 
ensure that a “consensus” for a high-quality site will rapidly emerge. Further, given enough 
interdependence and independence, a moderate correlation between each bee’s dance duration for her 
favored site and the site’s actual quality – that is, a moderate individual competence – is sufficient to 
secure this outcome, and thus the decision process is error-tolerant.  
In the hypothetical cases in which the bees lack either interdependence or independence, the decision 
process loses either its speed and decisiveness or its accuracy. Without interdependence, the bees fail to 
communicate to each other which sites are worth inspecting, and even good sites will only receive 
  
attention from those (few) bees who stumble upon them randomly. The emergence of a consensus for any 
site – let alone a site that may be difficult to find – is therefore unlikely, and at least extremely slow. It is 
worth noting, however, that the opposite limiting case in which the bees set their agenda only 
interdependently is also suboptimal: if the bees consider only those sites advertised by others and do not 
randomly roam the area at all, there is no chance for them to find any good sites not yet discovered by 
others. Still, this negative effect comes into play only at very high levels of interdependence.  
While the bees’ interdependence is crucial for the speed and decisiveness of the decision process, their 
independence in assessing any sites that have come to their attention is crucial for its accuracy. Without 
independence, the bees are vulnerable to informational cascades, whereby any random fluctuation in the 
dance activity for some site can be amplified into a consensus for it regardless of its quality. The crucial 
link between dance activity and actual nest-site quality will then be compromised. 
The computational results, and the bees’ observed collective performance in identifying the best nest 
sites, suggest that the bees avoid the dual dangers of not giving enough attention to good sites on the one 
hand, and informational cascades on the other, through a finely balanced interplay of interdependence 
and independence: interdependence in communicating to each other which sites are worth inspecting – 
and thereby in setting the agenda – and independence in assessing the quality of any site they inspect 
(List, Elsholtz and Seeley 2009). 
D. Conditions Favoring the Use of the Bees’ Decision-making Mechanism 
Although this decision-making mechanism has evolved in honeybees choosing nest sites, the structural 
features that make it work are transferable to other multi-agent systems. Any collection of agents that has 
to make fast and accurate decisions without an exogenously defined agenda can in principle implement 
the bees’ decision-making protocol, as formally captured by the model we have described. What is 
needed is the ability to roam the space of possible options, to identify and independently rate potential 
options, however fallibly, and to draw each other’s attention to options that are worth investigating. We 
have seen that organisms as simple as individual bees have this threefold ability, but nothing in this 
  
package of skills is tied to a particular species, a particular decision problem, or a particular biological 
realization. We can view the bees’ decision-making mechanism through a purely functionalist lens, 
abstracting away from the case of the bees, and ask in which decision-making environments a 
functionally similar mechanism would be useful.  
In epistemic decision problems, three conditions seem to favor the use of such a mechanism: (1) an 
open-ended agenda, (2) (relatively) high stakes, and (3) (relatively) high opportunity costs of indecision. 
In the bees’ case, as we have seen, all three conditions are clearly present. First, the agenda of potential 
nest sites is not straightforwardly given. Second, whether they find a good nest site, a mediocre site, or 
only a bad one can affect their survival and reproductive success. And third, indecision is not an option, 
since failing to reach a timely decision can threaten the swarm’s survival.  
Generally, we suggest that the less exogenously well-demarcated the agenda, the higher the stakes, 
understood as the utility differences between the options, and the higher the opportunity costs of 
indecision, the more a group can benefit from applying the bees’ mechanism. How successful a group 
will be if it does so then depends on its ability to balance interdependence in signaling to each other 
which options are worth considering with independence in the individual assessments of those options, 
over and above each individual’s epistemic competence. 
III. Applications 
We now turn to applications, using the mechanism of interdependence plus independence to assess a 
range of epistemic decision procedures in human institutions. Where the decisional environment most 
closely corresponds to the bees’ environment of nest-site choice – exhibiting an open-ended agenda, high 
stakes, and high opportunity costs of indecision, in the presence of common fundamental preferences – a 
mechanism akin to the one used by the honeybees works to best advantage.  
Our analysis is prescriptive and instrumental, not explanatory. We make no assumption that human 
institutions have evolved to efficiency, and thus do not seek to explain existing institutions by reference 
to the decision-making environment. We assume, in other words, that human institutions might or might 
  
not work well, in any given setting, and that under certain conditions humans can learn from honeybees. 
If there are disanalogies between the bees’ decision-making mechanism and any observed human 
procedure, this may sometimes give us some leverage to improve upon the latter. In particular, if a 
decision-making environment for humans has the features we have described, there may be strategies of 
mechanism design by which we could optimize human decision making in that environment. We take up 
the theme of mechanism design more generally after surveying a range of applications. 
A. Agenda-Setting on the Supreme Court 
If there is any governmental institution that routinely faces epistemic decision problems, it is the 
judiciary. Apart from a relatively small number of political cases, in which fundamental preferences 
differ along conservative and liberal lines, most cases present issues in which the judges have similar 
preferences but, at most, differing beliefs. This is true even at the level of the Supreme Court. Despite the 
strong selection pressure for hard cases to appear at the higher levels of the judicial hierarchy – easy 
cases are more likely to be settled, or never to be appealed – 47% of the Court’s decisions were 
unanimous in the 2009 Term,9 and in the cases with dissents, some large fraction involved disagreements 
about facts or diverging predictions about the consequences of a ruling one way or another. At the 
agenda-setting stage, a recent study finds that “legal considerations strongly influence justices’ agenda-
setting behavior”, although ideological differences play a role as well (Black and Owens 2009, p. 1063). 
We bracket the latter point and assume, without too much distortion of reality, that the justices share 
common fundamental preferences about what types of cases to hear. 
The Supreme Court is, however, unique in the broad control it enjoys over its own agenda. Since the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, the Court takes almost all of its cases by granting a petition for certiorari, and the 
Court possesses extremely broad discretion in deciding which petitions to grant. As a matter of practice, 
the Court is most likely to grant cases in which the lower courts have disagreed, or in which a federal 
statute has been invalidated on constitutional grounds.10 Yet in the end these practices are just rules of 
thumb or guidelines, which the Court follows or ignores according to circumstances. The Court’s 
  
discretion is increased by the sheer number of certiorari petitions that flood it every year – over 8,000 on 
average in recent years,11 of which the Court usually grants slightly over 80 on average.12 The problem 
for the Court as a body is to sift through the enormous mass of petitions to find the 1% that should be 
given the Court’s full attention. 
The Court’s decision-making environment, in other words, combines nearly unlimited agenda control 
and high search costs. A great deal of the Court’s business lies in deciding what to decide (Perry, Jr. 
1991). In this environment, the Court has developed, over time, a set of elaborate procedures for deciding 
what cases to take. The basic norm is a Rule of Four – the votes of four of nine Justices suffice to grant a 
certiorari petition for a full hearing. The voting takes place on petitions that are placed on a “discuss list” 
for the Justices’ weekly conferences; any Justice may place petitions on the list.  
Yet how can the Justices sort through, in a single term, more than 8,000 certiorari petitions to decide 
which ones even to place on the list at all? To do so individually would consume most of the Justices’ 
time. Accordingly, most Justices – at the time of this writing, all but Justice Alito – participate in an 
institution that seeks to generate economies of scale at the preliminary stage of identifying plausible 
candidates for the discuss list. This institution is called the “cert[iorari] pool.” The law clerks (the scout 
bees) employed by the participating Justices divide up the mass of petitions among themselves and then 
circulate a memorandum to all the Justices in the cert pool. In some chambers, a clerk for Justice X will 
prepare a second memorandum, but often this is done, or done well, only for petitions that the initial 
writer of the pool memo has recommended to be granted. The pool memo writer, in other words, has 
some de facto leeway to shape the Court’s docket, especially by recommending denial. The institutional 
pressure to “deny cert” is enormous, and a recommendation of denial is rarely contested or closely 
scrutinized by clerks in other chambers, unless a case has obvious political import. 
This institutionalized process of search-and-agenda-setting bears an imperfect, but illuminating, 
resemblance to the honeybees’ decision procedure. The cert pool is like the bees’ scout committee. Just 
as interdependence among the bees means that bees are more likely to inspect nest sites advertised by 
  
others, so too the effect of the cert pool is that Justices and clerks are more likely to pay close attention to 
petitions advertised by pool clerks as “certworthy,” or good candidates for a grant. Yet the evaluation of 
plausibly certworthy candidates is largely independent, both among the bees and among the clerks and 
their Justices. Once the cert pool writer has identified a plausible candidate for the discuss list, Justices 
and clerks in other chambers independently evaluate the petition to decide whether to place it on the 
Court’s agenda. Once a petition has been granted and a case has been given a full hearing, moreover, 
each Justice independently evaluates the legal claims. The Court’s process combines interdependence at a 
crucial preliminary stage – identifying, from the mass of petitions, plausible candidates for the agenda – 
with independence at all later stages of the decision-making process. 
How well does the Court’s process work? On one level it is impossible to know, because we have no 
independent benchmark assessment that would tell us which petitions in fact warrant a full hearing. Yet 
we can offer some conditional conclusions, and one implication. If and to the extent that the Court’s 
decision-making environment at the certiorari stage is understood as having the same features as that of 
the honeybees – an open-ended agenda, real stakes, and real opportunity costs of inaction – then the 
Court’s process is well-engineered for that environment, subject to some improvements we describe 
below. Whether those conditions are met is a matter for debate. Many critics of the Court believe that the 
Court should hear more cases and thus should grant more petitions; presumably these critics believe that 
it is better for the Court to make more decisions than fewer, perhaps because decisions by the Court 
clarify the law and promote legal, economic and political certainty. Views such as these implicitly 
suppose, in other words, that there are high opportunity costs, from the social point of view, if the Court 
too often fails to reach consensus on which cases to hear. In this light, interdependence at the early stages 
of the Court’s agenda-setting process is desirable; perhaps even more interdependence than currently 
exists would be desirable. Conversely, however, the marked independence of the later stages of the 
process is desirable to the extent one thinks that the marginal stakes in the Court’s decisions are high, so 
  
that information cascades and other phenomena associated with the lack of independence are especially 
harmful when they cause the Justices to reach consensus on the wrong (or worse) answer. 
Suppose one believes that the Court’s decision-making environment does present the combination of 
factors that make the honeybees’ interdependence-independence mechanism useful. An implication is 
that the cert pool should incorporate most but not all of the Justices, to optimize the balance of 
interdependence and independence. Recall that although the honeybees preferably assess nest sites 
advertised by others, they nonetheless each retain a nonzero probability of stumbling upon potential nest 
sites on their own. This residual independence, even at the agenda-setting stage, is crucial to the 
efficiency of the mechanism. As noted above, where interdependence reaches its limiting maximal value, 
“there is not enough noise in the system for bees to discover any new sites not advertised by others. Small 
noisy deviations from perfect [interdependence] are necessary to permit the discovery of new sites” (List, 
Elsholtz and Seeley 2009, p. 758). Likewise, a cert pool containing all Justices and their clerks would in 
effect place in the hands of a single twenty-something law clerk a real measure of de facto power to set 
the Court’s agenda, perhaps by burying certworthy cases. The existence of Justices who review all 
petitions independently of the pool is beneficial for the group, as it provides an independent check on the 
work of the pool clerks and creates a small amount of beneficial noise in the system, as the nonpool 
Justices and their clerks search for certworthy cases in parallel to the official search committee. 
It is hard to say, based on these general considerations, what the optimal level of participation in the 
pool might be. The number has varied over time; when the pool began to operate in 1972, it had only five 
members, but its size has grown steadily over time, and at present all Justices except one participate. 
Whatever the optimal membership, it seems likely that zero non-participants is too little, and the Court is 
now uncomfortably close to that extreme. The larger point is that understanding the mechanism of 
interdependent search plus independent evaluation at least identifies the variables that determine the 
optimal setup of the pool. 
  
B. Legislative Committees 
Legislatures are not often thought of as epistemic decision-making institutions. Rather, legislatures often 
act as a kind of political marketplace for bargaining between the major political parties, who have 
different fundamental preferences over major policies. Yet within parties, it is entirely plausible that a 
great deal of epistemic decision making takes place. Although parties are themselves coalitions, 
especially under first-past-the-post voting systems, legislative co-partisans are much more likely to share 
fundamental preferences with one another than with members on the other side of the aisle. The co-
partisans have common aims – perhaps to promote the public good, perhaps to stick the other party in the 
eye – and their problem is to aggregate differing information and beliefs so as to achieve their common 
aims. 
Enter legislative committees. There are many different theories of committees, all of which seem to 
capture some truth; however, we will focus on the implications of one such theory, the partisan control 
account of Cox and McCubbins (2007). On this account, political parties control committees. In contrast 
to interest-group accounts, which picture legislators self-selecting onto committees, the partisan control 
view holds that party leaders select committee members to promote partisan interests. In contrast to 
informational accounts, which see committees as serving the interests of the median member of the whole 
legislature (who has decisive power under simple majority rule), committees serve the interest of the 
median member of the majority party, who has decisive power in selecting the internal legislative leaders, 
who in turn control the composition of committees. 
It is at least compatible with this view to suppose that the partisan majorities who select and direct 
committees face an epistemic problem, conditional on the common preferences of co-partisans. 
Committee members search for policies that will promote the majority party’s preferences, perhaps 
because the partisan majority believes those policies best for the nation, perhaps because they are 
politically constrained by constituents to adopt certain policies or block others, or perhaps to embarrass 
the other party or split the other party’s internal coalition. Whatever the motivation, the task is epistemic 
  
in that a partisan majority has (much of the time, on many issues) common preferences but dispersed 
information and differing beliefs about how to satisfy those preferences. 
How can the party leaders identify and agree upon policies that will attain their ends? We suggest that 
the partisans might do well to imitate the bees, and in some respects already do so. They might set up a 
subgroup of the party membership to serve as a search committee. Individual members of this search 
committee would, in effect, roam the policy space to find politically useful legislative proposals. The 
members would then advertise any proposals identified as potentially useful, and would attract support 
from other co-partisans to the extent that, after inspecting the advertised candidates, they believe a given 
proposal is indeed politically valuable. If support reaches some critical threshold in the search committee, 
the committee would report out a bill embodying the proposed policy and, if politically feasible, the 
majority party would enact the bill into law. 
As described, this process displays the combination of interdependence and independence 
characteristic of the bees’ decision making. The co-partisans act interdependently at the agenda-setting 
stage in which useful candidate proposals are identified by individual members of the search committee. 
Committee members are more likely to give serious consideration to candidate policies identified by 
other committee members, rather than searching the policy space in a strictly individual fashion, without 
regard to the recommendations of others. Conditional on investigating alternatives proposed by other 
members, however, the members exercise independent judgment about the quality of those alternatives. 
The ultimate selection among the candidate policies is determined by independent assessment of 
alternatives generated interdependently. 
Real-world legislatures are not so different from this model process. We can understand legislative 
committees as searching the policy space for politically advantageous proposals, and then exercising 
conditionally independent judgment on a set of alternatives generated in an interdependent fashion. 
Prescriptively, from the standpoint of the majority party, the key question about this decision-making 
mechanism is whether the costs of interdependence at the agenda-setting stage exceed the benefits. Recall 
  
that the main cost is the possibility of premature herding towards a bad or at least suboptimal alternative 
because there has been insufficient exploration of alternatives. The main benefit is that insufficient levels 
of interdependence at the agenda-setting stage tend to produce a failure of consensus. Where the 
opportunity costs of inaction are high, as in the bees’ environment, avoiding this failure of consensus 
becomes a collective imperative. 
For party leaders, an important implication is that interdependence at the committee agenda-setting 
stage becomes more valuable as the costs of inaction increase. Imagine a political environment in which 
the majority party will suffer, politically, if it is perceived as running a “do-nothing Congress.” At the 
early stages of the n-year legislative cycle, party leaders and committee chairs will do well to afford 
individual committee members more freedom to search out proposals that will put the opposing party in 
an awkward position, or will promote the majority’s platform. This freedom will slow down the process 
of consensus formation, but result in an increase in the expected quality of the eventual consensus, from 
the majority party’s point of view. As the election cycle nears its close, the opportunity costs of inaction 
increase, because the costs of being charged with running a do-nothing Congress increase. Party leaders 
should tighten up the process of search and resolution by requiring greater interdependence among 
committee members. Committee consideration should focus on the alternatives already identified, 
although committee members should be allowed to exercise independent judgment among those 
alternatives. 
The comparison should not be pressed too far. How much are rank-and-file legislators really like scout 
bees? And do Senators bear anything more than a superficial resemblance to drones? A key difference 
between the insect hive and Capitol Hill is that legislatures are more specialized internally. Rather than 
having a single search committee to make a highly consequential collective decision (such as the choice 
of a new nest site), legislatures have multiple search committees each assigned to a different area within 
the total policy space. Moreover, these committees have partially overlapping jurisdictions, and the 
boundaries between their jurisdictions may be fuzzy.  
  
Yet this jurisdictional fuzziness may work well, as judged against the bees’ mechanism. As in the 
certiorari pool, where the optimal level of participation is not 100%, so too it is not desirable, from the 
standpoint of party leaders, that there be complete interdependence at the committee agenda-setting stage. 
Complete interdependence would eliminate all noise from the system, and thus eliminate any prospect for 
members to stumble upon new and highly advantageous proposals not found by others. Jurisdictional 
fuzziness can introduce some desirable noise by making it possible, although unlikely, that a member 
from another committee will stray into the policy space and stumble upon a valuable proposal that 
members of the principal committee have overlooked. Of course, we do not suggest that the jurisdictional 
overlap and fuzziness of typical legislative committee-structures is best explained on these grounds; it 
arises for a number of political and historical reasons, rather than on the basis of any considerations of 
optimal collective decision making. Yet in light of the bees’ arrangement, jurisdictional overlap and 
fuzziness may be associated with some epistemic benefits.  
C. Searching for Leaders: Executive Appointments in Firms  
The bee’s search-and-decision mechanism is most advantageous to the group when the decision-making 
environment combines high stakes (making independence at the voting stage valuable) with high 
opportunity costs of indecision (making interdependence at the agenda-setting stage valuable), while the 
agenda is relatively open-ended. Plausibly, the search for leaders in for-profit firms and non-profit 
organizations presents just such a decision-making environment. First of all, the set of possible 
candidates is not so easy to identify. The stakes of the choice are high, because leadership and charisma 
are scarce resources whose presence or absence can make or break institutions, and because firms and 
organizations tend to search for new leadership in periods of crisis, in which routine decision making is 
not viable and executive decisions are particularly consequential. The opportunity costs of failing to reach 
consensus on the selection of a new leader are also high under such conditions, because passivity and 
inaction are often the worst possible strategies for institutions in crises; it is better to have a strong hand 
at the helm than to drift in treacherous waters, even if it is unclear which way it is best to go. 
  
The implication is that leadership searches in firms and organizations, especially in crisis conditions, 
should attempt to combine interdependence and independence in roughly the ways we have outlined. We 
will focus on the structure and procedures of executive search committees in universities. When 
universities select new leadership – say, the university’s President – the process typically involves a 
search committee. At Harvard University, for example, the search committee that selected Drew Gilpin 
Faust as President consisted of the six members of the University Corporation, plus three members of the 
University’s Board of Overseers. University search committees often operate in a secretive fashion, so it 
is difficult to know how they make decisions. But the pool of suitable candidates is usually not so easily 
defined, and in the environment in which Faust was selected – in early 2007, as the financial crisis 
became ever more severe – the stakes were high and the opportunity costs of deadlock serious. 
In such an environment, leadership search committees should engage in interdependent agenda-setting 
and independent assessment. Interdependent agenda-setting will mean that individual members of search 
committees tend to focus their attention on candidates previously proposed by other members of the 
search committee, rather than roaming the space of candidates purely on their own. The committee 
members who propose candidates early in the process may have predominant influence in setting the 
agenda. Yet this does not entail interdependence at the stage of evaluation. To the contrary, committee 
members should decide with strict independence whether the candidates on the agenda meet the threshold 
set by the group’s established criteria. Procedural mechanisms such as the use of secret ballots within the 
committee can maximize independence under certain conditions. 
In this picture, there are twin evils to be avoided. On the one hand, insufficient interdependence would 
result in an excessively protracted search process, as committee members would spend too much time 
searching for new candidates to put on the agenda, and devote too little attention to evaluating the 
candidates others have put forward. On the other hand, insufficient independence would produce 
informational cascades that might settle on a bad candidate. The optimum is a process that allows agenda-
  
setters to structure the pool of candidates, yet subjects those candidates to fully independent evaluation – 
maximizing the chances of settling on a good candidate, with reasonable expedition. 
Similar lessons apply to committee decisions on the award of symbolically important prizes, such as 
Nobel Prizes and other national or international recognitions of merit. In such decisions, the pool of 
candidates tends to be open-ended; the stakes are high due to the cultural, intellectual, political or 
sometimes commercial repercussions of an award, and not meeting the deadline for an award is normally 
not an option. Here, too, committees are often secretive about their procedures, but our discussion 
suggests that – at least in cases of common fundamental preferences – they would do well by balancing 
interdependence in arriving at a list of nominated candidates with an independent assessment of these 
candidates’ merits. 
D. Research and Development in Firms 
Just as the honeybees’ mechanism can be applied to identify candidates for certain positions or awards, so 
it can also be applied to identify projects worth developing. Imagine a firm with a large staff of research 
experts – scientists, engineers, or other knowledge workers – who engage in two sorts of tasks, dividing 
time between them in some proportion. One task is to independently search the space of technically 
feasible innovations for potentially profitable innovations, and then to promote them to other researchers. 
Another task is to assess potentially profitable innovations promoted by colleagues. In the second task, 
assessment is independent, but the choice of innovations to be assessed is interdependent. By promoting 
an innovation, researchers set the epistemic agenda for colleagues, who suspend their independent search 
and decide whether the proposal meets some threshold of plausibility. Proposals that attain sufficient 
support in the research group are kicked upstairs for further assessment by higher management. 
How should this process be structured to maximize the firm’s expected utility? From the standpoint of 
the firm, the optimal allocation of time by each individual researcher will not be either of the corner 
solutions – either the one in which each researcher spends all her time independently searching for 
profitable innovations, or the one in which each researcher spends all her time assessing innovations 
  
proposed by others. In the latter case, there will be no innovations to assess – not everyone can be 
reactive, or there will be nothing to react to – while in the former case, no consensus will form and the 
firm’s collective resources will be scattered too widely across different projects. The optimal time 
allocation balances independence and interdependence. 
There are several examples of highly creative firms that use an optimizing mechanism of this sort. In 
the 1950s, 3M allowed its research staff to devote 15% of their time to independent projects, whose 
results would belong to the firm. Famous innovations resulted, including Post-It Notes and masking tape. 
More recently, Google has a similar policy at the 20% level, which has been credited with producing 
Gmail and Google News.13 
This picture is a heroic simplification, because for-profit firms are often cited as examples of groups 
of actors with conflicting fundamental preferences. Standard principal-agent models of such firms begin 
with the premise that the lower-level agents have preferences that diverge from the preferences of the 
principal – the firm’s leadership, somehow defined – so that researchers may want to slack off, or to 
research questions that are of maximal interest to them rather than of maximal expected utility to the 
firm, and so on. But the picture we advance has some utility to the extent that compensation mechanisms, 
incentive schemes, informal norms, or selection and screening at the hiring stage align the interests of 
researchers with the interests of the firm and its principal(s). Where that is so, it is not impossible to 
understand the optimal research and development process in for-profit firms along the lines we suggest, 
and to reconfigure the research and development process within actual firms accordingly.  
E. Basic Research 
To illustrate the limits of the analysis, we suggest that there is a large domain in which the social utility of 
the bees’ decision-making mechanism is more limited: basic research, especially in the natural sciences. 
By basic research we mean research that has no currently foreseeable applications or direct payoff for 
applied sciences, such as engineering. Although society does well to fund a portfolio of basic research, 
  
some small fraction of which will pay off handsomely in the long run, there is no expectation that the 
payoff will materialize in the short run. Theoretical research in physics is the standard example. 
Importantly, the process has both an epistemic dimension and a dimension of collective choice. The 
epistemic dimension is that we envisage basic research as a process of searching for theories about (some 
aspect of) the world, and we assume that some theories are objectively correct while others are 
objectively incorrect. The collective choice component can be understood either from the standpoint of 
funding institutions, or from the standpoint of scientists themselves. For funders, typically panels or other 
groups, the problem is to fund a portfolio of basic research that maximizes net present value to the 
funding institution or to society generally. For scientists, the problem is to generate a set of possible 
theories and then to reach consensus on the ones that are true, while collectively rejecting those that are 
false. As we will see, these twin collective aims – theory generation and theory sifting – trade off against 
one another. 
In basic research, the bees’ mechanism would entail that researchers focus their attention primarily on 
questions identified by other researchers, and then proceed to address them independently. This has 
indeed been the tendency in basic research, which is increasingly conducted in teams across the natural 
sciences. Such teams in effect focus on questions identified by a leader or head, or on questions that have 
become fashionable, having received attention from other researchers; team members do not ask whether 
the question is the right one to pursue, only how, if at all, it can be answered. Although there are powerful 
institutional and individual incentives to form such teams, their social utility is an open question. 
Our analysis suggests that an excessively high degree of interdependence at the agenda-setting stage 
of basic research is undesirable. The reason is that the opportunity cost of failing to reach consensus on 
basic theories is relatively low, where one assumes as we do that consensus on those theories will have no 
immediate payoff. Basic research is a long-run enterprise, in which it is better that things be settled right, 
eventually, than that things be settled today. The cost of failing to reach consensus – the main cost of low 
interdependence – is typically a lesser concern; the greater concern is, or should be, that excessive 
  
interdependence may leave some very promising theories sitting about undiscovered, because no one has 
been searching for them.  
Our point is not that basic research teams are inaccurate, or unreliable. With the bees’ combination of 
high interdependence and high independence, basic research teams will make accurate assessments of 
theories put on their scientific agenda by team leaders, yet some excellent theories may go unconsidered 
by anyone. With lower interdependence, more scientists will roam the theoretical space alone or in 
smaller teams; more theories will be explored, but by fewer people in each case. That retards the 
generation of consensus on the theories considered, yet reduces the number of true theories overlooked 
altogether. 
By the nature of the case, it is hard to know whether there are many excellent theories waiting to be 
found, and if so where they might be (if one knew those things, one would already be in position to find 
the theories). But we can motivate our view by pointing to the domination of string theory within 
theoretical physics, as a plausible example of the costs of interdependence. In the current generation, “it 
is virtually impossible (in the U.S.) for someone not working within [the string theory] paradigm to be 
hired as an assistant professor [of physics] at a major research university” (Elster 2009, pp. 19-20). 
According to critics, theoretical physics is focused to the point of obsession on evaluating and expanding 
one particular theory or family of theories while other approaches go unexplored. Meanwhile, a growing 
number of people have begun to question whether string theory is even a scientific enterprise at all, given 
the difficulty of using the theory to generate implications that are both testable and unique to the theory 
(Elster 2009, p. 20; Woit 2006). If the criticism is right, theoretical physics suffers from excessive 
interdependence of the research agenda. Similar social dynamics among researchers may be responsible 
for the excessive disciplinary rigidity of which mainstream economics is sometimes accused.14 
F. Statistical Groups: Ratings and Individual Choices 
We may also consider an extension, from the judgments made by actual groups to the virtual judgments 
made by statistical or notional groups, and to individual choices that rely upon the judgments of those 
  
statistical groups. An example of what we have in mind is the website “Rate My Professors,”15 where 
students can see, for any given professor, an “overall quality” score that averages all ratings, as well as 
composite scores for “easiness” and “hot(ness).” Students who use websites of this sort to decide where 
to allocate their course time are implicitly relying upon the collective judgment of a statistical group. 
Importantly, not all professors have ratings. Which professors will be rated depends on the decentralized 
choices of other students, who in effect advertise the (high or low) quality of a professor by choosing to 
rate them. That choice in turn influences the choices of later students to take or not to take a given course; 
the students who do so may then record an independent assessment of the professor’s quality, which will 
in turn influence the choices of yet later students, and so on. There is interdependence among students at 
the stage of deciding which course to take, yet independence (ideally, at least) at the stage of rating. 
More generally, a similar combination of interdependence and independence can appear in a broad 
range of individual choices influenced by the decisions of earlier participants to advertise (including in 
negative terms) the quality of the choices. The relevant category here is the rating system, which can be 
distinguished from a ranking system; the former is decentralized while the latter is inherently centralized. 
Under a ranking system, some individual or group attempts to reach a synoptic overview of the relevant 
choices – an exogenously defined set – and compares them all with one another in order to arrive at an 
overall ranking. Under a rating system, by contrast, collective judgments emerge from the decentralized 
action of participants who search the space of possible choices, advertise for or against candidates they 
like or dislike, and thereby influence the choices of other participants whether or not to consider or 
sample the relevant goods. Although individuals decide which options to consider or pursue by 
considering the aggregate judgment of a virtual group, their assessment of those options is (ideally) 
independent. In this respect, the growing prevalence of rating systems for consumer goods – particularly 
experience goods like films,16 hotels, vacations,17 and gourmet restaurants18 – shows that homo sapiens 
has already begun to do as the hive does, although many millennia after the hive perfected its mechanism 
of decentralized search. 
  
G. Interdependence, Independence and Institutional Design: Veiling Mechanisms 
In any decisional environment that satisfies the three conditions we have described – an open-ended 
agenda, high stakes, and high opportunity costs of indecision – the challenge for institutional designers is 
to balance interdependence and independence. The former is beneficial at the stage of agenda-setting, in 
order to coordinate on suitable agenda items, while the latter is beneficial at the stage of evaluation of 
those items, in order to maximize the accuracy of the resulting decision. 
A difficulty, however, is that interdependent agenda-setting might spill over into the stage of 
evaluation. Suppose, for example, that in an executive search committee one committee member is 
known to have placed a candidate on the agenda because he or she considers the candidate to be of very 
high quality. That knowledge might then affect the others’ substantive evaluations of the candidate, 
reducing their independence. Indeed, taking into account the information embodied in the agenda 
proposals of others may be individually rational for any given participant, so long as the benefits of 
incorporating the information are greater than the additional cognitive costs.19 
There is thus a potential disanalogy between bees and humans. In the bees’ mechanism, individuals do 
not directly observe others’ full quality assessment, which is encoded in the duration of their dances. 
Dance duration indirectly affects the probability that other bees will investigate a given site, but there is 
no direct spillover of information from the agenda-setting stage to the evaluation stage. Observing 
duration may exceed the cognitive capacities of any individual bee. Thus the bees are indirectly 
advantaged by their low cognitive capacities, combined with the structure of their decision-making 
mechanism. Paradoxically, humans’ superior cognitive capacity enables them to infer information from 
agenda proposals, compromising independence; humans thus face the spillover problem. 
The proper response to the problem, however, is not to declare the bees’ mechanism irrelevant to 
human collective choice in epistemic contexts. Rather, the challenge is to replicate the conditions for the 
bees’ success by employing strategies of mechanism design. The same human ingenuity that creates the 
spillover problem can also ameliorate it, by enabling human institutional designers to develop 
  
mechanisms that shield the stage of independent evaluation – in whole or at least in part – from the 
information required for interdependent agenda-setting. 
The precise mechanisms that can enforce such shielding are highly context-specific. But we will 
describe one general class of veiling mechanisms20 that in one way or another limit the information held 
by participants when evaluating proposals others have placed on the agenda. Such mechanisms will 
create a barrier between interdependence and independence to prevent spillovers that might compromise 
the latter. By depriving human decision makers of information they might use – quite rationally – in ways 
that compromise independence, veiling mechanisms indirectly replicate the bees’ lower cognitive 
capacities, with the paradoxical result of improving group performance. 
Here are some examples. In executive search committees, one might establish an impartial officer to 
serve as a depository for proposals to place a candidate on the agenda.  The officer will inform members 
of the bare fact that some other member has proposed consideration of the candidate, but nothing more. 
Whereas under ordinary procedures, each member of the committee will know who proposed the 
candidate and will hear a formal or informal presentation of reasons in the candidate’s favor – 
information that might compromise independence at the stage of evaluation – the laundering of proposals 
through an intermediary acts as a partial veil that reduces the flow of compromising information. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court might experiment with veiling procedures. Under current practice, the 
pool memorandum that recommends a grant of certiorari often contains a detailed statement of the case 
and of the parties’ arguments, and lists the name of the authoring law clerk. Although we doubt that this 
information has a large compromising effect on the independence of evaluation by Justices and other 
clerks, especially since cases are ultimately decided only after full briefing and argument, one might 
eliminate the law clerks’ names and at least some of the other information to minimize the risk of 
spillover. In these and other settings, spillover is not only a problem, but also an opportunity to design 
mechanisms that replicate and exploit the advantages of the bees’ procedure.             
  
Conclusion 
We conclude by underscoring the central programmatic implications of our analysis for the study of 
institutional design. Whatever the merits of the honeybees’ collective-choice mechanism, it reveals two 
major gaps in the literature on epistemic collective choice: the role of agenda-setting and the importance 
of time. More broadly, the honeybees’ mechanism illustrates a mode of arbitrage – from the evolved 
decision-making strategies of non-human animals to the design of human institutions – that amounts to a 
form of comparative institutional analysis across species. We offer a few remarks on each point in turn.  
Epistemic agenda-setting. Machiavelli ([ca. 1513] 1996) observed that “a multitude without a head is 
useless.” In his motivating example, a group of plebians who threatened to secede from Rome proved 
entirely incapable of negotiating with the patricians, because the plebians had no leader to make 
proposals to them and speak for them. Although Machiavelli did not clearly distinguish between the 
aggregation of judgments and preferences, his observation holds in either setting, insofar as he is pointing 
out that it is often costly for decision-making groups to structure their own agendas. Even when a 
decision-making group shares all fundamental preferences in common, it must make choices between 
alternatives, and the alternatives must come from somewhere. Given realistic constraints on the time and 
cognitive capacities of the group, it is not feasible for all members of the group to put as many proposals 
as they see fit on the agenda, and then for the group to vote on all proposals. Instead, some member or 
members must act as epistemic agenda-setters who narrow the range of options. 
From another standpoint, however, Machiavelli’s claim is misleading. The epistemic agenda-setter on 
a given issue need not be a “head” or leader, in the sense of an individual member, specified ex ante, who 
possesses agenda-setting authority across the board. Rather the agenda-setter can be a rank-and-file 
member, or the member of a search committee, who advertises the quality of a given option to other 
members, who in turn coalesce around a particular option and influence the choice of the group as a 
whole. In the honeybees’ procedure, there are epistemic agenda-setters, but they are otherwise 
  
unremarkable rank-and-file bees. It is pragmatically necessary that there be epistemic agenda-setters, but 
that is a different topic than leadership. 
Many issues lurk here, and there is much to be explored. The honeybees’ procedure merely illustrates 
that work on collective epistemic decision making, in economics and rational choice theory more 
generally, has neglected the issue of epistemic agenda-setting, and has generally rested content with 
models that treat the options for decision as exogenous. The next generation of epistemic models should 
relax this assumption. 
Time, truth-tracking, and collective search. A second and related issue is that Condorcetian models of 
collective epistemic decision making are excessively static. Those models illuminate the idea that 
collective decisions can produce correct or incorrect judgments, relative to the common aims of the 
group; in that modest sense, the models attempt to show conditions under which group decisions can 
“track the truth” (Grofman, Owen and Feld 1983, Estlund 1993, List and Goodin 2001). Yet the 
Condorcetian models show little appreciation of the brute fact that searching for the truth takes time. 
Sensible groups will trade off the benefits of obtaining the very best answer against the opportunity costs 
of information exchange, deliberation, and possible failure to reach consensus, resulting in no group 
decision at all (in effect a decision for the status quo, which may be untenable or the worst option of all). 
By contrast, models of search processes in economics, behavioral economics and biology are acutely 
sensitive to the opportunity costs of search and to tradeoffs between speed and accuracy. Yet those 
models frequently involve a single decision maker, perhaps a consumer, and thus abstract away from the 
crucial collective epistemic problem: multiple decision makers have different beliefs and information, 
which must somehow be aggregated through an optimizing procedure.  
The honeybees’ decision procedure lies at the intersection of these problems. The honeybees face a 
problem of collective search in an epistemic context. Some options are much better than others, given the 
common fundamental preferences of the group, yet different members of the group have different 
information than others, and the group’s problem is to pick an optimal strategy for collective search. Of 
  
course, the honeybees do not pick a strategy, either individually or collectively; yet natural selection has 
produced individual-level behaviors that cause the bees to behave in a collectively optimal fashion. For 
human purposes, the bees’ as-if collective search strategy is worth considering in any decision-making 
environment that resembles the bees’ environment. As we have tried to show, humans face similar 
environments in a range of institutional settings. 
Comparative institutional analysis across species. The last point explains the sense in which, and the 
conditions under which, the hive provides useful lessons for humans. Precisely because individual bees 
have such low cognitive capacities, the apparent efficiency of their collective search strategy, in their 
environment, is all the more striking. To the extent that their aggregation mechanism exhibits efficiency, 
the human problem is to describe the features of their environment in suitably abstract terms – the terms 
of economic theory and decision theory – and then to ask whether there are similar human environments 
or decision problems to which the bees’ mechanism might be carried over. Nothing in this process of 
analysis, abstraction and transposition requires drawing dubious analogies between humanity and the 
hive. Drawing lessons from the hive is merely a form of comparative institutional analysis across rather 
than within species. Just as institutional designers may observe other human organizations in the social 
world, to find institutional forms that would otherwise never have occurred to them, so too designers may 
observe the products of natural selection to broaden their repertoires. 
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Appendix: A Formal Model 
In what follows, we give a brief summary of the formal model and simulation results from List, Elsholtz 
and Seeley (2009), on which we draw in the main text.  
Model 
There are 
• n scout bees, labeled 1, 2, …, n; 
• k potential nest sites, labeled 1, 2, …, k, where qj  ≥ 0 is the objective quality of site j; 
• discrete time periods, labeled 1, 2, 3, … 
The state of each bee i at time t is represented by a pair xi,t = (si,t,di,t), where 
• si,t ∈ {0,1,2,…,k} is the nest site for which the bee dances at the given time (si,t = 0 means “no 
dance”), and 
• di,t ≥ 0 is the remaining duration of the dance (measured in number of time periods). 
  
The initial state of the model is xi,1 = (0,0) for all i (“no dancing at the beginning”). The state of each bee 
in each time period depends on her own state and that of the other bees in the previous period. We 
consider two cases. 
The first case: bee i is in the non-dancing state at time t. Formally, si,t = 0. Bee i then commences a 
dance for one of the sites 1, 2, …, k or remains in the non-dancing state at time t+1 with probabilities 
p1,t+1, p2,t+1, …, pk,t+1 and p0,t+1, respectively. This determines si,t+1. The probabilities (for j > 0) are given 
by the formula 
,)1( ,1, tjjtj fp λπλ +−=+  
where π j is the ex ante probability of finding site j, fj,t is the proportion of bees dancing for site j at time t, 
and λ is the interdependence parameter, capturing how much the bees influence each other through 
signaling. The remaining dance duration at time t+1 is given by the formula 
di,t+1 =
qj exp(Tσ ) with probability 1−µ  ("independent assessment")
K exp(Tσ ) with probability µ  ("non-independent mimicking"),
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where Tσ is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation σ ≥ 0 (the 
reliability of bee i – the lower, the more reliable), and K is some strictly positive constant, not related to 
the quality of nest site j. The parameter µ is a proxy for the independence between bees in their 
assessment of any nest site, once they have identified it. This completes the specification of xi,t+1 = (si,t+1, 
di,t+1). 
The second case: bee i is dancing for one of the sites at time t. Formally, si,t > 0. Here 
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Now, a consensus between the bees is reached when the total number of bees dancing for one of the 
sites at some time t, 
nj,t = {i : si,t = j} ,  
  
meets an appropriate “quorum” criterion, such as the following illustrative ones: 
• site j receives more dancing support than any other site at time t, i.e., nj,t > nh,t for any h ≠ j with h 
≠ 0 (a “weak consensus” criterion);  
• site j receives more than twice as much support as the second most supported site at time t, i.e., 
nj,t > 2nh,t for any h ≠ j with h ≠ 0, and more than 20% of the scout bees are engaged in dancing (a 
“strong consensus” criterion). 
Of course, other criteria could be used as well, but the computational results were relatively robust.  
Results 
Using this model, List, Elsholtz and Seeley (2009) provide computational support for the following 
hypotheses: 
• For non-extremal values of σ and λ (and µ = 0), the bees choose the best site (Hypothesis 1). 
• The bees’ independence in assessing the sites’ quality and their interdependence through 
signaling are necessary and sufficient for the reliability of the decision process  (Hypothesis 2). 
In the simulations reported in the cited paper, the number of scout bees was fixed at n = 200 and the 
number of nest sites at k = 5. For illustrative purpose, the sites’ quality levels q1, …, q5 were fixed at 3, 5, 
7, 9, 10, capturing differences across sites as well as closeness between the top sites. These parameter 
values were motivated by Seeley’s empirical studies. It was also assumed that the ex ante probabilities of 
finding one of the sites was just 25%, evenly distributed across the five sites, so that π1 =  … = π5 = 5% 
and π0 = 75%. The bees’ behavior was simulated over 300 time periods.  
Table 1, from List, Elsholtz and Seeley (2009), shows how often each nest site was chosen in 250 runs 
of the simulation, for different levels of individual reliability and interdependence, using the two 
consensus criteria defined above. The results are broadly consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
  
 
 
 
High individual reliability 
(σ = 0.2) 
Low individual reliability 
(σ = 1) 
Strong 
consensus 
criterion 
Weak 
consensus 
criterion 
Strong 
consensus 
criterion 
Weak 
consensus 
criterion 
High 
interdependence 
(λ = 0.8) 
1st best site 
2nd best site 
3rd best site 
None 
246  (98.4%) 
0  (0%) 
0  (0%) 
4  (1.6%) 
250  (100%) 
0  (0%) 
0  (0%) 
0  (0%) 
199  (79.6%) 
5  (2%) 
0  (0%) 
46  (18.4%) 
237  (94.8%) 
12  (4.8%) 
0  (0%) 
1  (0.4%) 
Medium 
interdependence 
(λ = 0.5) 
 
1st best site 
2nd best site 
3rd best site 
None 
104  (41.6%) 
0  (0%) 
0  (0%) 
146  (58.4%) 
226  (90.4%) 
22  (8.8%) 
0  (0%) 
2  (0.8%) 
94  (37.6%) 
1  (0.4%) 
0  (0%) 
155  (62%) 
220  (88%) 
28  (11.2%) 
0  (0%) 
2  (0.8%) 
Low 
interdependence 
(λ = 0.2) 
1st best site 
2nd best site 
3rd best site 
None 
11  (4.4%) 
1 (0.4%) 
0  (0%) 
238  (95.2%) 
176  (70.4%) 
63  (25.2%) 
1  (0.4%) 
10  (4%) 
7  (2.8%) 
0  (0%) 
0  (0%) 
243  (97.2%) 
190  (76%) 
58  (23.2%) 
0  (0%) 
2  (0.8%) 
Table 1: Simulation Results for Hypothesis 1 (from List, Elsholtz and Seeley 2009) 
To separate out the effects of independence and interdependence, List, Elsholtz and Seeley (2009) 
further ran a number of simulations with the level of interdependence ranging from low (λ = 0) to high 
(λ = 1), while assuming high individual reliability and independence (σ = 0.2 and µ = 0), and a number of 
simulations with the level of independence ranging from low (µ = 1) to high (µ = 0), while assuming high 
interdependence and individual reliability in case a bee checks a site’s quality (λ = 0.8 and σ = 0.2). 
Figures 1 and 2 display the proportion of wins for each of the five sites, ordered by quality from worst 
(site 1) to best (site 5) (in 250 simulations for each set of parameter values), for different levels of 
interdependence and independence, where the stronger consensus criterion is used for determining the 
chosen site. The results are broadly consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
  
Figure 1: Interdependence ranging from low to high 
 
Figure 2: Independence ranging from low to high 
 
Figures 1 and 2: Simulation Results for Hypothesis 2 (from List, Elsholtz and Seeley 2009) 
 
For further details, readers are directed to List, Elsholtz and Seeley (2009). 
Notes 
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for helpful research assistance. 
1 Famous examples include Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651, ch. 17), and Aristotle’s History of Animals, cited 
and quoted in Depew (1995, p. 156).   
2 The idea of a fruitful dialogue between research on human and non-human collective decisions has been 
suggested in a recent symposium, edited with an introductory survey (pp. 719-742) by Conradt and List 
(2009). A noteworthy interdisciplinary study included in this symposium is the one by Dyer et al. (2009). 
In a subsequent working paper, Akçay et al. (2010) suggest that biologists can learn from institutional 
analysis in political science. We reverse their emphasis by exploring what human institutional designers 
can learn from non-human animals. 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
3 We here employ the notions of “preferences” and “beliefs” as they are used in decision theory, micro-
economic theory, and philosophy more generally. Preferences and beliefs are different kinds of 
intentional attitudes of an agent. Beliefs are representational attitudes encoding what the agent takes the 
world to be like. Preferences are conative attitudes encoding what the agent wants the world to be like. A 
rational agent, very roughly speaking, pursues his or her preferences in accordance with his or her beliefs. 
For further details on this notion of agency, see, e.g., List and Pettit (2011, ch. 1). 
4 The terminology of “independence” and “interdependence” was introduced in relation to honeybee 
decisions in List, Elsholtz and Seeley (2009), building on earlier empirical work (e.g., Seeley, Visscher 
and Passino 2006, Lindauer 1955). 
5 On the independence condition and various relaxations of the condition, see, e.g., Boland (1989), Ladha 
(1992), Estlund (1994), Dietrich and List (2004), Berend and Sapir (2007), Kaniovski (2008), Dietrich 
(2008), and Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013). Outside the specific literature on Condorcet’s jury 
theorem, there is, of course, a sizeable body of work on how rational agents update their beliefs in 
response to signals received from others, but, unlike the present paper, that work does not focus on 
epistemic agenda setting, and so the kind of interdependence between agents analyzed in that literature is 
different from the one discussed here. See, among many others, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006). 
There is also social-scientific experimental evidence suggesting that the wisdom-of-crowds effect can be 
undermined by social influences. See, e.g., Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer and Helbing (2011). 
6 The following discussion draws on List and Pettit (2011, ch. 4). See also the earlier references on 
various relaxations of independence. 
7 Formally, jurors are no longer independent conditional on the original truth about the crime here; they 
are at most independent conditional on the shared body of evidence (Dietrich and List 2004). 
8 On the notion of epistemic free-riding, see List and Pettit (2004). 
9 To be sure, this point is only consistent with epistemic voting; it does not necessarily demonstrate its 
existence. Unanimity does not logically entail that there is no conflict of fundamental preferences in the 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
case at hand. Under unusual circumstances, it is possible that there are two blocs of Justices who have 
opposed fundamental preferences but also have opposing beliefs, and who thus share identical derived 
preferences, although for completely different reasons. But unanimity is at least compatible with, and 
provides some evidence of, lack of deep preference conflict. The most casual glance at the Court’s 
decisions in any Term, especially the ones issued between November and (say) April, will show a large 
number of unanimous or near-unanimous decisions in humdrum technical cases, on matters of regulation, 
taxation and court procedure, in which it is implausible that there are fundamental conflicts. 
10 Gressman et al. (2007), pp. 242-50 (“The Supreme Court often, but not always, will grant certiorari 
where the decision of a federal courts of appeals, as to which review is sought, is in direct conflict with a 
decision of another court of appeals on the same matter of federal law or on the same matter of general 
law as to which federal courts can exercise independent judgments. One of the primary purposes of the 
certiorari jurisdiction is to bring about uniformity of decisions on these matters among the federal courts 
of appeals.”) (emphases in original deleted); id., at 264-67 (“Where the decision below holds a federal 
statute unconstitutional or where a federal statute is given an unwarranted construction in order to save its 
constitutionality, certiorari is usually granted because of the obvious importance of the case.”) 
11  From October Term 2004 to October Term 2008, the average number of petitions was 8170.6 (7496 
cases were filed in the 2004 term, 8521 in 2005, 8857 in 2006, 8241 in 2007, and 7738 in 2008). See 
Roberts, Jr. (2006-2009). 
12 In the years 2004 to 2008, an average of 82.8 cases were argued before the Court. (87 in 2004, 87 in 
2005, 78 in 2006, 75 in 2007, and 87 in 2008). See Roberts, Jr. (2006-2009). 
13 See, e.g., http://www.scottberkun.com/blog/2008/thoughts-on-googles-20-time/, accessed 29/8/2010.  
14 See, e.g., a special journal issue on “Economics for the Future”, edited with introduction (pp. 827-835) 
by Kitson (2005).  
15 At http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/.  
16 E.g., http://www.rottentomatoes.com/.   
  
                                                                                                                                                              
17 E.g., http://www.tripadvisor.com/.   
18 E.g., the Guide Michelin and http://www.yelp.com/.   
19 We might describe this as the “evaluator’s curse.” Cf. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996). 
20 For an analysis of veiling mechanisms in constitutional design, see Vermeule (2007), pp. 27-71. 
